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ABSTRACT 
FIRM PARTICPATION IN MORALLY CONTESTED MARKETS 
Jiao Luo 
 Organizational participation in morally contested markets, that is, 
markets surrounded by controversy reflecting values-led beliefs, is an 
understudied topic (Zelizer, 1978, 1979; Healy, 2006; Quinn, 2008; Anteby, 
2010).  The extant research has tended to focus on the genesis and evolution of 
contestation toward certain categories of trades, to the relative neglect of 
attention toward the responses of organizations, to such contestations.  Yet the 
market exchange outcomes of organizations hinge not only upon social relations 
(Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi 1996, 1997) and power distribution (Blau, 1964; 
Emerson, 1976) but also upon the legitimacy benefit that exchange might render 
(Jensen, 2006).   
 In deciding whether and how to engage in markets associated with 
debated legitimacy, organizations establish and express their meaning, status and 
identity (Phillips and Owens, 2004; Jensen, 2010).  Particularly in markets that 
are morally contested, firms inevitably balance two competing sources of 
institutional demands:  the rationale for economic efficiency, and the defense of 
values and norms. In weighing and negotiating these interests, how do firms 
behave and choose in response to institutional and organizational factors?  
Meanwhile, organizations on either side of the market act as critical forces to 
enhance or challenge a market’s capacity to survive (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007; 
  
King and Pearce, 2011); given this, how do the organizational participation 
decisions matter for the institutionalization of a new, morally convicted market 
as a whole? 
 This dissertation studies organizations as customers, by looking at factors 
that facilitate or impede their purchasing decisions in morally contested 
markets.  I examine firms’ differing decisions toward participation in one such 
market, the carbon credit trade, across several countries displaying varying 
cultural attitudes. I study these choices at the nascent, unstable stage, before the 
carbon market has become institutionalized as a viable solution strategy 
responding to global environmental challenges.  I argue that firms construct the 
proper scope of commercial activity via channels including managers’ individual 
mental accounting as well as social norms and law, and that all channels can be 
understood as culturally dependent.  Building upon cross-national qualitative 
comparative work of morally contested markets (Zelizer, 1979), I empirically 
link market participation patterns to dissimilarities originated from the various 
national institutional environments surrounding firms (Healy, 2006).  
 I look at organizational structural and strategic factors that affect firms’ 
participation in morally contested markets, in order to understand how cultural 
norms matter for firms’ choices.  The prevailing norms and values in the country 
where a firm operates may be deemed to matter, either because of a firm’s 
reputational concerns vis-à-vis its customers; or because of firm internal 
rationales, e.g. the top management also shares those values, or the firm wants to 
  
appeal to current or potential employees who share those values.  By looking at 
whether cultural values matter more for firms that are more retail oriented, or are 
more inclined to retain employees, or have a chief executive officer with 
educational background in economics, I disentangle the internal and external 
mechanisms.   
 The empirical context for understanding the organizational and 
institutional dynamism of morally contested markets is the carbon market.  By 
facilitating the exchange of carbon credits, the carbon market authorizes an 
entity to achieve greenhouse gas reduction goals by exchanging part of its 
obligation with another party, which is believed to both lower the costs of 
mitigation and increase the efficiency of emission reductions (Sandor, Walsh 
and Marques, 2002; Stern, 2006).  Since its debut in 2005, however, the idea of 
carbon trading has been much contested, based on claims that the environment is 
a sacred good and that providing a market for pollution allows the wealthy to 
evade their responsibilities (Caney and Hepburn, 2011).  The carbon market, 
then, offers a fitting setting for my study in three ways:  First, the market 
prompts firms to make a distinct choice, between efficiency and norm.  Firms 
reducing their carbon outputs choose either to trade on-market, which is a more 
efficient solution but violates the cultural notion of a “non-tradeable” 
environment, or to reduce in-house, which is perceived as a less tainted way of 
emission abatement, yet a more costly one.  Second, the carbon market purports 
to respond to the issues of global warming and climate change, which has 
  
become increasingly recognized as a global priority.  Examining the carbon 
market can elucidate how organizations across nations differ their choices on 
carbon trading, based on the given organization’s headquartered country values 
and norms.  Third, this carbon market allows for directly examining the values 
effect, by offering a relatively clean-cut measure for the efficiency gains that the 
market mechanism would provide.  
 My results suggest evidence of a strong cultural norm effect that can 
indicate whether firms are likely, or not likely, to engage in the carbon credit 
market.  Firms located in countries where people more frequently voice 
skepticism toward market mechanisms in environmental policy are less likely to 
engage in the carbon credit market.   The channel is specific to cultural norms 
about environmental-economic trade-offs and not to norms about environmental 
concerns in general.  Moreover, by looking at firm-level factors such as 
consumer orientation, CEO educational background, and sector-level factors 
such as unemployment rate, I highlight the mechanisms through which cultural 
values are demonstrated.  The result suggests that for firms’ choices, cultural 
values and norms do matter, for reasons based in rationales that are both internal 
and external.   
 Beyond illuminating such a values effect that influences the choices 
firms make, this work reveals the nuanced ways in which values-based beliefs 
impact corporate behavior by examining the interplay between cultural norms 
and countervailing sources of legitimacy, namely, regulatory forces as well as 
  
other firms’ decisions or experiences.  The results suggest that while firms 
regulated to reduce emissions have a higher rate of carbon market participation, 
the rate difference between regulated and unregulated firms is evidently larger in 
countries where the idea of using the market to deal with environment problems 
is perceived as less acceptable.  In the meantime, there is little to no evidence 
that similar or connected organizations' decisions toward participation in the 
contested market engenders a positive spillover that reinforces the values effect.  
Both results hint at the unique properties of the values effect as it tends to 
separates "good" firms from "bad" firms, according with the extent to which 
corporate behaviors conform to the moral ideals.   
 My investigation of the carbon market among European firms contributes 
to the institutional literature by highlighting the importance of specific national 
institutions in particular organizational domains (Vasudeva, Spencer and 
Teegen, 2012) as well as interrelatedness between institutional theory and 
strategic perspectives in the context of firm market participation decisions 
(Oliver, 1991).  By assessing the effect of national cultural values in legitimating 
these nascent markets while taking into account the opportunity cost of not using 
the market, my dissertation sheds light on some of the conditions that determine 
when and how much concerns about legitimacy, controlling for efficiency, loom 
large in market behaviors, as well as which organizational and institutional 
mechanisms are involved. 
  
 This dissertation also contributes a new framework for thinking about 
morally contested markets in responding to the relative lack of studies on what 
happens before the institutions become institutionalized (Fligstein and Dauber, 
1989), by connecting and extending literature on institutionalization.  One of 
institutional theory's main ideas is that the legitimacy of practices within an 
organizational field rises with the level of their diffusion in the field (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). By studying the values effect in 
the nascent stage of institutional development, my dissertation reveals a 
necessary but often understated condition for extant explanations of institutional 
shifts (Schneiberg and Soule, 2005), that is, for the instrumental and normative 
rationality of an institutional project to occupy the same domain which implies 
the capacity to reinforce each other.  In cases where the rationale of economic 
efficiency is separated from normative rationality by strict moral codes, these 
moral challenges not only impede buy-in, but also prevent the enactment of the 
diffusion processes as well as shifts in cultural framings and thus halted the 
dynamism that usually underlies the spread of practices and social changes.  
Identifying whether a market institution is embedded within the right social 
environment helps to shed light on the divergent institutional trajectory that new 
markets follow.   
 This research has implications for corporate reputation management.  A 
key aspect of corporate social responsibility is dialogue with and responsibilities 
to diverse stakeholders that project conflicting demands and raise difficulties for 
  
companies seeking to meet those demands.  The case of the carbon market poses 
challenges and interesting trade-off for companies intending to pioneer in 
innovative but controversial CSR instruments. This paper also aims to arrive at 
implications for the design of the carbon market and policy making.  Many 
observers take the view that the answer to invigorating the carbon market lies in 
identifying ways to increase demand or reduce supply of carbon credits. What I 
show and suggest is that, the dissolution of moral restrictions on the carbon 
market can be seen as one of the most important processes among attempts to 
institutionalize this currently quasi-taboo market, and should be part of the on-
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 The intellectual roots of dealing environmental problems with tradable 
property rights may be traced back to Adam Smith's invisible hand theory, cross-
pollinated with Ronald Coase's market allocation system of property rights.  
Adam Smith observed that "[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, than we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their 
own interest (Smith 2000[1776], pg. 15)". That is, even though individuals are 
not leaning towards promote the public interest, they are restrained from 
charging above-average price for good and services they provide so that 
customers won't switch to alternative suppliers.  The competitive mechanism in 
the market figures out the price automatically, as well as the best allocation of 
resources. This is because when the price of certain goods gets too low, sellers 
who are then earning less for the equivalent amount of work will shift to more 
profitable activities. Coase expanded the functioning of market to the clearing of 
property rights.  Rather than characterizing pollution as a market failure problem 
that could be solved only by extra-market measures such as government 
administered tax, Coase (1960) suggested a market of pollution rights where the 
polluters could purchase the right to pollute the air by paying local residents to 
contractually give up their right to use clean air, and argued that in the absence 
of transaction cost, such a market achieves a socially optimal allocation of 




 Such a market-led environmental activist approach, introduced in the 
1960s (Crocker, 1966; Dales, 1968) and congressionally legislated for EPA 
implementation as the Clean Air Act in the late 1970s, proved successful for 
raising air quality standards in the U.S. (Tietenberg, 2006), and were thus tapped 
for incorporation in the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 as the so-called “carbon 
market,” an cross-national initiative for addressing the negative environmental 
impacts of global greenhouse gases.   
 The schema for a global carbon market stems from three innovative 
advantages:  First, it converts the environment from public good to private good, 
by establishing clear property rights on who emits how much.  Second, by 
putting a price on emissions, it provides information about whether it is more 
cost-effective for entities to reduce emissions internally, or cheaper to purchase 
the emission credits on the market, so that the overall cost of abatement is 
economized.  Third, allowing businesses to sell extra emission credits 
incentivizes them to assess and find the most efficient ways of reducing 
pollution.  Overall, as in both the Smithian and Coasian model, the carbon 
market aligns firms' incentives in profitability maximization with the societal 
interests, by providing the mechanisms through which each firm would be able 
to make socially optimal decisions.  Since its introduction in 2005, carbon 
trading has gained significant traction. Besides the most famous European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that is currently operating in Europe in 




markets, as well as in more than ten other regional, national, and sub-national 
regional initiatives in countries including, among others, the U.S., New Zealand, 
Australia, India, South Korea, China, and Brazil.  
 Against this backdrop of a wide rollout and increasing visibility and 
salience over the past decade, the carbon trading market is, nonetheless, far from 
becoming an institutionalized instrument for emissions reduction. As of the time 
of writing of this work in 2012, the price of carbon credits languished in a 
prolonged slump of $9 per tonne of carbon dioxide, which was significantly 
lower than its peak price of roughly $39/tco2, and well below the $12.8/tco2 that 
some experts have viewed as the average physical marginal cost of abatement in 
the system.  Even though carbon markets give companies the flexibility to either 
reduce their own greenhouse gases or buy emissions permits, the number of 
firms that actually exercise this market option is quite limited.  So far, the 
prevalence of adopting the market mechanisms has stalled at about 15% among 
European firms, and at 5% among the largest U.S. firms.1  Moreover, the climate 
change challenge, which architects of the carbon market aim to address, remains 
daunting.  The general consensus among scientists who focus on climate change 
is that to allow for a likely chance of keeping the increase in temperature to 2°C, 
greenhouse gas emissions need to be stabilized at the level of 39-44 gigatons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e).  That number at the end of 2009 was 
estimated at 49.5 GtCO2e, and is likely to reach 56 GtCO2e by 2020 under the 




business-as-usual projections (The World Bank, 2012).  The minimal impact of 
the market instrument in worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases raises serious 
doubts about the evolutionary potential of the carbon markets.   
 Taking stock of the cumulative impact of carbon market mechanisms, it 
appears that even though the ideas of carbon markets are not without virtues and 
there have been significant efforts to move the regime onto the path of 
progressive development, the carbon market has, nevertheless, shown some 
early signs of arrested development (Davis and Anderson, 2008).  This is 
reflected in both limited adoption of the market instrument, as well as in a lack 
of consensus concerning the normative status of its operation.  How could we 
account for such an interrupted phase in the case of the climate regime?  More 
generally, what happens in the era before institutions become institutionalized 
(Fligstein and Dauber, 1989)? Insights can be drawn from this interesting and 
substantively important context, contributing to our understanding of the 
institutional change of new markets. 
 Chapter 2 reviews the contemporary scholarship on models of 
institutionalization and points out some of the gaps in this literature, particularly 
in explaining the current institutional story in the carbon market. Chapter 3 
presents the empirical context of this analysis, the carbon credit market. Chapter 
4 presents theory and hypotheses regarding the impact of values, organization 
structure and strategy, and other countervailing institutional forces on firm 




test the propositions in Chapter 4.  Chapter 6 reports the analysis results. Finally, 
Chapter 7 discusses contributions to the literature and implications for corporate 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Models of Institutionalization 
 Institutions are defined as the "rules of the game in a society" (North, 
1990, pg. 3), and consist of "cognitive, normative and regulative structures and 
activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior" (Scott, 2001, pg. 
33).  Institutions define norms, stabilize expectations, and enable ordered actions 
by prescribing consistency in human activities.  While stable by definition, 
institutions do not come into existence automatically, nor do they exist 
ostensibly.  The increase of institutionalization, that is, the process by which 
structures and activities get transmitted and acquire stability (Zucker, 1977), 
needs to be explored in order to better understand why and how some 
institutional projects stick, while others fail.  
 A practice becomes institutionalized when it is integrated with a social 
order, and can be reproduced without substantial mobilization and contestation 
(Scott, 2001).  Studies encompassing the range of transformations in cultural and 
economic practices—from gradual shifting of organizational structure or 
culinary procedures into take-for-granted rituals, to sweeping adoption of new 
technologies—have informed how a social order might be attained and 
reproduced. Schneiberg and Soule (2005) characterize the process of 
institutionalization by four distinct modes, including "cultural expression" (e.g., 
Dobbin, 1994; Meyer and Jepperson, 2000; Meyer and Rowan, 1977), "diffusion 




(e.g., Edelman, 1990; Edelman et al., 1999; Fligstein, 1990, 1996), and "political 
process" (e.g., Schneiberg and Soule, 2005; Stryker, 2002).  While each of these 
modes emphasizes different aspects of institution building, they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.  In fact, often they can be intertwined, and 
unmasking a single instance of institutionalization requires enacting more than 
one of these processes.   Just as importantly, a theory of institutionalization must 
examine ideas that failed to surface, spread and stick (Fligstein and Dauber, 
1989).  Failed institutionalization refers to situations where a practice languishes 
in short of a legitimate status.  This is often reflected by lack of adoption or 
persistent controversy about the practice.  Below, I will review literature on 
modes of institutionalization, aiming to understand each theory tradition's 
explanation on how institutions are created, as well as why some institutional 
projects fail to be successful.   
 Early institutionalism scholars adopt a top-down perspective and think of 
institutionalization as a large symbolic totality and process of rationalization.  
The adoption of certain practices reflects and is enforced by a system-wide 
cognitive and normative structure, encompassing "public opinion, the views of 
important constituents, knowledge legitimated through the educational system, 
social prestige, the laws, and the definitions of negligence and prudence used by 
the courts" (Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 343).  These rule-like social structures are 
taken-for-granted, such that the adoption of them is quasi-automatic and goes 




emphasis on macro-level factors such as cultural understandings (Meyer and 
Jepperson, 2000), meaning systems or national polities (Dobbin, 1994), and less 
on actors, their characteristics, and individualized interests. In this mode of 
institutionalization, theory is generally inadequate to explain the endogenous 
emergence of unorthodox practices.  If a practice belies a misfit between the 
values and meaning it purports to represent versus the impersonal rules of the 
system, it is likely to face strong resistance from those agents that represent the 
societal values and exercise social control (Zucker, 1977).   
 The second mode of institutionalization, rather than treating actors as 
homogeneous, distinguishes actors into two different types: the ones that receive 
functional necessity from a practice awaiting to be institutionalized, and the ones 
that do not (Tolbert and Zucker, 1983).  The first type of actors is incentivized to 
become early adopters of the practice, and their early adoptions increase the 
normative values of the practice in the larger population. Once the number of 
endorsers passes a threshold, the practice acquires a normative status which is 
thereafter taken for granted as fact, and can be transmitted directly on that basis.  
The second type of actors are obliged to follow suit and adopt this practice, even 
though it might not bring pragmatic benefits or could sometimes even be 
harmful to their own performance.  On this account, institutionalization includes 
two stages, a local problem-solving stage in which organizations develop or 
import a new form or policy in response to immediate challenges they encounter, 




order to attain legitimacy and consistency with the larger structure (Davis and 
Greve, 1997; Strang and Meyer, 1994; Colyvas and Jonsson, 2011). In turn, 
failed institutionalization means that a practice does not arrive at the minimal 
requirement of adoption threshold to attain the normative status.    
 The third model of institutionalization introduces shocks to extant 
systems as the sources of institutional change.  These shocks disrupt existing 
practices and render the assumptions underlying the setup of the extant system 
untenable.  Generally exogenous, examples of these interventions include the 
passage of laws, court rulings, and the creation of new agencies.  Such acts 
evoke uncertainty, claims making and political struggles over jurisdiction, as 
different groups of actors seek to institute their preferred practices or 
conceptions as the new dominant logic.  In so doing, they produce disruptions to 
the system, and provide windows of opportunity for a succession of players, 
forms and logics to mobilize, grab power, and establish new institutions 
(Edelman, 1990, 1992; Edelman, et al. 1999; Filgstein, 1990, 1996; Hoffman, 
1999; Sine and David, 2003).  At the same time, coming from a different 
theoretical origin, rational choice theory (North, 1990) also perceives exogenous 
shock as the way to shake the system so that new institutions can be created and 
extended.  Here, the failure of institutionalization means falling short of a 
punctuated revolutionary crisis to shake up the orders established and 




 The fourth model is the political process approach, which deals directly 
with the conflicts inherent in institutional systems (Schneiberg and Soule, 2005). 
This approach views institutions as collectively enforced rules and norms, 
established by negotiated rights and obligations for actors.  Institutionalization is 
a constant struggle between groups in mobilizing resources, framing cognitive 
schemes and institutional models, and shaping outcomes that best maximize 
their interests.   
 Could these four accounts plausibly explain the developmental path of 
carbon markets that I introduce in the first chapter?  Consistent with a view of 
institutionalization as expression of cultural understandings, players in the 
carbon market have used the language of efficiency to justify introducing market 
mechanisms in solving the commons problem.  In fact, the carbon market was 
posed and accepted as a means to achieve and allocate efficiency, by allowing 
parties that can reduce emissions effectively to receive economic incentives for 
reducing more carbon (Stern, 2006).  Moreover, consistent with arguments about 
diffusion, member nations of the Kyoto protocol watched each other closely for 
interpretation and adoption of the practice. Consistent with an image of 
exogenous shock, the carbon market emerged in response to the global warming 
challenge.  In fact, there is a growing consensus that coping with climate change 
by preventing profound disruptions and adapting to major changes is emerging 
as one of a handful of issues that will define the era.  Finally, consistent with the 




consultants and third parties emerged who actively frame people's understanding 
of the market catalyst that encourages key players to take an active interest in 
adaptation (McNish, 2010).  So, why is it the case that we see patterns of 
arrested development in the carbon market?    
 Closer inspection of the case leads to a different view, one that looks 
back to Viviane Zelizer (1979)'s classic study on morals and market. This view 
also draws on work that conceptualizes institutional orders as constituted by 
plural and competing principles and logics (Stryker, 2002).  Before I delve 
deeply into this question, I will first give a short overview of the carbon market 




CHAPTER 3: THE CARBON MARKET: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 
The carbon market operates, in many ways, like any commodity 
market; producers have a commodity to sell, and consumers have a demand 
for that good.  The commodities exchanged in the carbon credit trade, 
however, are not tangible goods. Rather, they are the license to, and the 
promise not to, emit greenhouse gases. Those selling the commodity 
essentially give the buyer the promise not to emit a specific amount of carbon 
dioxide so that the buyer can consume the commodity by emitting that specific 
amount of carbon dioxide.   
The trading mechanism for the carbon market is an institutional 
innovation designed to deal with a problem, i.e., global warming or climate 
change, which affects a resource commons, the environment. Over the past 
decade, the problem of climate change has gained critical momentum as an 
issue of progressive global concern.  Climate scientists observe an intensifying 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and have warned of the serious 
consequences to humankind:  escalating global temperatures, rising sea levels 
and increased frequency of extreme weather, along with greater flooding, 
droughts, loss of plant and animal species, and increased malaria transmission 
(IPCC, 2001).  Moreover, scientists suggest that the long-term damages 
expected to arise from climate change will exceed the costs of addressing the 
problem now by a wide margin (Stern, 2006). There is a growing awareness 




politics or national security.  To organize collective actions on a global level 
and fight the challenge, a group of nations ratified an international mandate 
known as the Kyoto Protocol, which commits signatory states to take actions 
toward meeting targets and timetables for emissions reduction, and 
incorporates participation in market-based mechanisms as effective means 
toward emissions reduction.   
Proposing the design for a world market in emissions reductions, 
Richard L. Sandor, economist and architect of the successful acid rain market 
in the U.S. in the 90s, designed the schema for a global carbon market. 
Initiated in 2005, the carbon market has since grown into a 176 billion global 
business (The World Bank, 2012), with a handful of different emissions 
trading venues up and running.  The most noteworthy is the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which came into effect since 2005 and now close 
to finishing the second phrase.  In the EU ETS scheme, the countries hand out 
a number of emissions allowances to companies, which set a cap on possible 
emissions, while subsequently reducing the cap gradually over time.  
According to the European Commission, about 10,000 facilities are under the 
EU ETS and account for more than half of the EU’s Co2 emissions. They 
include power generation plants using fossil fuels, oil refineries, coke ovens, 
iron and steel plants, and factories making cement, glass, lime, brick, ceramics 
and pulp and paper (The World Bank, 2012).  Companies surrender one 




atmosphere.  Emission rights are freely traded. If companies’ cuts to emissions 
are insufficient, they can meet requirements by switching to low-carbon fuels, 
increasing efficiency or adding emission-control technology, rather than 
paying a hefty fine. They could also buy the allowances needed from brokers 
or from other capped firms on the market, who are emitting below their caps 
and have extra allowances to sell.   
Along with allowances, there is another market outlet that is made 
available, named the offset markets. Offsets, like allowances, provide 
companies with the right to emit. Unlike allowances, however, offsets permit 
entities to offset, or compensate for, their emissions by financing carbon 
control projects outside of the system. For instance, if an electric utility with 
no caps in China elects to build a windmill instead of a coal plant, it may 
qualify for offset credits that equals to the emissions levels in the windmill 
minused by that of the coal plant.  
The market mechanism of the offset scheme permits the utility to next 
sell this offset credit to a utility with capped emission amounts in Switzerland, 
allowing the Swiss utility to meet its regulatory obligations without reductions 
on its own or buying allowances from other firms with caps (McNish, 2010).  
Therefore, emissions of a particular geography or sector within the cap and 
trade regime will be above the cap level, but emissions external of the regime 
will drop by a corresponding amount. Overall, the system's contribution to 




Moreover, in order to generate the credits, the project participating in the 
offset trade must realize emissions reductions that are “additional,” implying 
they should not have happened without the project.  Once the additionality has 
been confirmed, the amount of emissions reduction achieved by the project 
will become available for sale as carbon credits, and those credits can then be 
used to fulfill EU-ETS requirements.   
Among the global offset programs currently in force, most significant 
are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI), 
both of which are administered by the United Nations and harvests carbon 
credits from emerging and developed economies, respectively.  Common to all 
these markets, the demand for emission credits is not exclusively compliance-
based.  A number of non-capped firms also purchase these credits voluntarily, 
in anticipation either of future regulation or of public relations benefits.  
Importantly, once individual firms become accountable for meeting 
emissions reduction targets, they are not subject to any requirements regarding 
choice of instruments to meet their commitments; they are free to pursue the 
goals while choosing their preferred instruments.  Such a mechanism design 
offers benefits: The provided flexibility of choice recognizes the diversity 
among both countries and firms, with regard to their existing production 
systems and timetables for replacing emission intensive facilities, and 
essentially encourages maximum levels of involvement by heterogeneous 




keep emerging on the pros and cons of different approaches to the reduction of 
GHG emissions.   
Indeed carbon trading, albeit a promising idea, has faced many thorny 
contestations since its inception (Corbett, Montgomery and Dacin, 2011).  
Primarily, two normative arguments challenge the carbon market:  On one 
hand, conceptualizing environmental protection in monetary terms is deemed  
unacceptable (Vatn and Bromley, 1994).  Emission trading schemes assume 
that humans have property rights in the world, and for some that is considered 
to be undesirable and degrading, i.e., the natural environment cannot be 
regarded as people’s private property, and it belongs to a class of goods that 
should not be traded.  Defending this argument, Lisa Bunin, spokesperson for 
the environmental NGO Greenpeace commented,  
“Industry simply does not have the right, nor should it ever be 
given the right, to make money off our air.  Air is a part of nature that 
is priceless–it is essential to all life on earth. It must never be allowed 
to be quantified or traded by industry over the heads of communities, 
nor should industry be allowed to bribe communities into consenting to 
allow them to do so. … In my view, it is a highly offensive and 
dangerous program that should be eradicated at the earliest 
opportunity.” 
 
From another perspective, the carbon market arguably violates 
people’s belief systems about accountability, ie. that polluters should pay for 
their actions, rather than being offered an easy way out (Bohm and Siddhartha, 
2009).  The idea of buying “the right to pollute” (Coase, 1960) is concerning 




alienate.  Long before the idea of a carbon market was executed, Sandel 
(1997) commented to The New York Times on the immorality of such 
markets, by highlighting the difference between a fee and a fine,  
“..turning pollution into a commodity to be bought and sold 
removes the moral stigma that is properly associated with it;   if a 
company or a country is fined for spewing excessive pollutants into the 
air, the community conveys its judgment that the polluter has done 
something wrong.  A fee, on the other hand, makes pollution just 
another cost of doing business, like wages, benefits and rent. The 
distinction between a fine and a fee for despoiling the environment is 
not one we should give up too easily.  Suppose there were a $100 fine 
for throwing a beer can into the Grand Canyon, and a wealthy hiker 
decided to pay $100 for the convenience.  Would there be nothing 
wrong in his treating the fine as if it were simply an expensive 
dumping charge?  Or consider the fine for parking in a place reserved 
for the disabled.  If a busy contractor needs to park near his building 
site and is willing to pay the fine, is there nothing wrong with his 
treating that space as an expensive parking lot? In effacing the 
distinction between a fine and a fee, emission trading is like a recent 
proposal to open carpool lanes on Los Angeles freeways to drivers 
without passengers who are willing to pay a fee.  Such drivers are now 
fined for slipping into carpool lanes; under the market proposal they 
would enjoy a quicker commute without opprobrium. (Sandel, 1997)” 
 
This argument, it should be noted, makes no claim that those who 
purchase emission permits are somehow not making a sacrifice as obviously 
they are.  The problem raised is that they are not making the right type of 
sacrifice.  The polluter should only fulfill their duties by keeping the emissions 
within a pre-determined cap.  Extending the argument even more aggressively, 
best selling author and columnist George Monbiot observed that the carbon 
market can be considered analogous to the selling of indulgences in the 15th 




payment to clergy, and commented that similarly, the carbon offset market 
allows for polluters to pre-pay for a clean conscience despite continuing dirty 
business as usual.  
“Just as in the 15th and 16th centuries you could sleep with 
your sister and kill and lie without fear of eternal damnation, today you 
can live exactly as you please as long as you give your ducats to one of 
the companies selling indulgences. It [Carbon Offset] is pernicious and 
destructive nonsense.” 
  
 Similar argument challenging the carbon market as modern form of 
"selling indulgence" can be also found in Smith (2007). A good summary on 
the layers of moral contestation surrounding the carbon market is provided by 
Dr. Graciela Chichinisky, author of the carbon market chapter in the United 
Nations Kyoto Protocol, describing the attacks she received, 
“My book “Saving Kyoto” provides a step by step report of the 
abuse I received as the author of the carbon market of the United 
Nations Kyoto Protocol, in particular the responses I received while I 
designed and then wrote the carbon market itself into the 
Protocol…Initially I was accused of being an unabashed capitalist who 
was trying to find a market approach to the sacred values of the 
environment, allowing emitters to get off easy if they paid - and not too 
different from 'selling one's own grandmother'.”  
  
 Complicating the issue, the argument of moral illegitimacy that 
challenges the carbon market becomes intertwined with other factors, such as 
concerns for cognitive and pragmatic illegitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman, 
2008).  Considered furthermore problematic are the over-allocation of carbon 
permits, as happened in the EU ETS, as well as the basic technical feats of 




contestation, however, is perhaps the strongest and stickiest form of criticisms 
that impedes the carbon market from growing.   
 Given the availability of the carbon market as an economically 
efficient tool, and in view of the moral baggage that comes with it, firms 
aiming to reduce their emissions have a distinct choice to make: They can 
either reduce emissions directly by implementing energy-efficient 
technologies internally, or they can help achieve emissions reduction by 
buying emission credits or other forms of offsets to balance their own excess 
emissions.  Executives for VINCI, a French construction and engineering 
company, expressed their cost-related reasons for engaging in carbon offsets, 
in response to 2009 CDP survey:  
“We investigated being carbon neutral on several on our projects. This 
is achievable for some concession projects that run on a long time and 
can resort to renewable energy (e.g.: airport or stadium concessions). 
However, for construction projects (roads, heavy civil …), carbon 
neutrality is unachievable without massive resort to carbon offsetting.” 
  
 On the other hand, legitimacy concerns are huge in firms' carbon 
projects.  The discourse of HSBC about its highly publicized decision to become 
carbon neutral brings out into open an interesting combination of these different 
motives. The HSBC managers stated that it arose from pressure from various 
sources: "the pressure to reduce our emissions wasn’t overt but it did exist, from 
peers, from shareholders, from the NGOs we work with and from our own staff" 
(Slade 2007: 96). So legitimacy with different actors is a concern in driving 




that they need to reduce their own emissions as well as to be certain of the 
credibility of their involvement in the carbon market.  In fact, a lot of firms 
emphasized that they work with reputation intermediaries to make sure that all 
credits purchased can be certified and validated.  Other firms try to justify their 
usage of the carbon market and minimize possible reputational damage either by 
attributing their carbon market involvement to lack of knowledge.   Some claim 
that they were unaware of the dubious nature of the carbon credits before the EU 
ruled them out.  For example, a public affairs officer in the Netherlands 
company mentioned in the report, 
 “We buy CERs over-the-counter, at the time of the transaction, 
Dow, and in many cases even the seller, don’t know from which types 
of ... projects the CERs originate.” 
 
 Facing the critiques toward the carbon market, firms actually find it hard 
to go into offsetting even because of cost reasons. They view emission trading 
and offset projects as a means of reducing emissions without the necessity of 
internal efforts (an easy way out), and therefore oppose those mechanisms, 
stating that they intend to take responsibilities themselves through internal 
measures.  For example,  managers in Swiss company UBS, carefully considered 
the critical voices while deciding whether to use the market instrument or not, 
and stated,  
 "It is important that internal and external audiences understand 
the value of the program. While we obviously focus on cost-
effectiveness, for example by buying offsets when break-even or in-
house investments cannot be reached in a reasonable time frame, we 




rich; they can afford to buy their way out of reducing emissions." So 
we need to optimize across climate change and the UBS reputation." 
(Oberholzer-Gee, Reinhardt, and Baabe, 2007).   
 
 Of course, firms that take action with regard to climate change do not 
necessarily adopt one measure or another, more likely opting to combine 
different measures in order to achieve emission abatement goals.  What may best 
explain firms’ varying levels of engagement in the carbon market could depend 
on the extent to which managers perceive the environment as a good that is 
tradable through the medium of market, and such perception is culturally variant. 
 So, what have we established so far?  First, we have seen that an 
institutional innovation, the market for carbon credits, has become an 
institutional project with early patterns of arrested development. We have 
reviewed the extant literature on the institutionalization projects, and from the 
surface, the carbon market plausibly has the necessary conditions for 
institutionalization.  By delving deeper into the institutional story of the carbon 
market, we have identified the moral contestations surrounding its viability, as 
well as how these contestations might have penetrated to the degree that firms 
become influenced in their decisions whether or not to participate.  Below, we 
leverage further analysis regarding this observation; we compare this carbon 
market with other markets that we have observed in the literature about morally 
contested markets, and we see how such moral contestation might interact with 
other firm and industry-level characteristics to impact the institutionalization 







CHAPTER 4: THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Market as a Cultural, Institutional Project 
 The market is a central institution in modern society, where it prevails as 
an efficient way of organizing (Powell, 1991; Swedberg, 1994).  Claims to 
efficiency alone, however, do not suffice to explain why markets come to exist.  
Legitimacy—the perception that audiences hold on whether an actor’s behaviors 
are congruent with the norms and values of the larger social system—is essential 
among conditions determining whether markets become institutionalized or not.   
The idea that legitimacy concerns are important for markets has not always been 
salient. In fact, neoclassical economic concepts of the perfect market have, at 
times, become so dominant as to leave any discussions on market legitimacy 
behind.  Reflecting their discontent with the parsimonious neoclassical economic 
conceptualization of the market, organizational analysts have proposed 
arguments that view the market as a social construction (see reviews in Biggart 
and Delbridge, 2004; Fourdein and Healy, 2007).  By considering seriously the 
idea that values, beliefs, and culture is central to understand markets (Zelizer, 
1988), the standpoint that markets are social constructions gives rise, in turn, to 
the idea that legitimacy matters for markets, and that legitimacy contestation can 
impose real constraints on a given market in terms of legality, operations and 
growth.   
 As a central concept in the institutional literature, the legitimacy of 




the cultural-cognitive (Scott, 2001).  A practice is deemed to be normatively 
legitimate when it is consistent with the norms or values that the institution 
expects as dues of social obligation from its members.  Regulatory legitimacy is 
obtained when a practice conforms to established rules and laws, whereas 
cultural-cognitive legitimacy is garnered when a practice reflects the shared 
understandings that the institution asks of its adherents to mimic or follow. New 
markets, by definition, run short of cognitive legitimacy.  Organizational studies 
have shed light on the roles organizational participants may play in shaping 
perceptions of their environment and acquiring cognitive legitimacy for new 
market categories. The central focus of these studies has been on how new 
markets acquire legitimacy status over time, with the underlying assumption that 
early adoption of the market aid in the further legitimacy and the increase of 
instrumental rationality of the practice.  
 
Market and Moral Codes 
 How normative legitimacy guides behavior in markets is relatively 
underexplored. Normatively challenged exchange, or so-called "block exchange" 
(Walzer, 1983), means the embargo or constraining of the trading of certain 
types of objects or services based on moral standards.  Generally speaking, 
blocked exchange features the detachment of the goods or services that are 
connected to "sacred" social values from the "profane" sphere of the market 




blockages. Instead, value rationality, which refers to the belief in the value of an 
action independent of its consequences for oneself or for others, is what 
motivates blocked exchange.  As Durkheim (2008[1912]) has pointed out, the 
sacred and the profane are separated into two domains.  This implies that 
tabooed exchanges cannot be attributed by their contribution to economic 
efficiency and gains. The restriction on some transactions might have positive 
influences. Nevertheless, the justification for prohibiting these transactions is not 
based on the economic reasoning but originated from social values that dishonor 
them on moral grounds. 
 Cognitive theorists, further, give useful explanations on the reasons why 
moral codes operate in separate domains from instrumental rationality, by 
empirically documenting the human tendency to mentally compartmentalize and 
to organize love, status, information, money, goods, and services into distinct 
mental accounts (Foa and Foa, 1976). Teichman and Foa (1975) reported that 
when individuals received different types of resources in exchange, the exchange 
became less satisfying.  Research on the “taboo trade-off” further presents 
evidence about the challenge of exchanges that cross the boundaries of resource 
categories (McGraw and Tetlock, 2005).  This work examines exchanges 
between the important secular values (e.g., money, time and convenience) with 
sacred values, and found that they are considered morally incompatible. 
Experimental evidence further demonstrated that when people contemplate 




more likely to refuse to answer certain questions, engage in pricing distortions, 
or display moral outrage and cognitive confusion.  The evidence suggests that 
there is a psychological transaction cost for people to make value comparisons 
across mental accounts, which may affect the wheel of material exchange 
(Ingram and Zou, 2008).  The intensity of the resistance of contemplating a 
cross-account value comparison depends on the distance and the direction 
between the two schemas involved in the valuation (Fiske and Tetlock, 1997).   
 Examples of goods that are inclined to be prohibited from monetary 
exchange in contemporary times are not hard to find, and can be grouped into 
three general categories (Beckert, 2006). One is exchange that affects the human 
body. It is illegal to purchase another person (slavery and adoption). The sale of 
body parts for medical reasons is mostly lawed out (markets for organs); in 
many countries, woman are not permitted to carry a child for another woman in 
exchange for cash (surrogacy); and the exchange of sex for money is restricted 
and even prohibited in many counties (prostitution).  A related domain is the 
market exchange of political impacts and seats. The purchase of political 
decisions is regarded as corruption. Another domain constitutes of legal claims.  
Examples of such claims and obligations include criminal punishment, the right 
to vote, the freedom of speech, or exercising religious beliefs; all of these are 
considered non-marketable. 
 While the general categories exist, the list of objects to which trade 




fields where such changes have taken place include the limits placed on interest-
charging lendings, as well as the abolishment of slavery. Cultural variances can 
be observed in religiously oriented taboos on the consumption of particular food 
like horse meat (Roth, 2007).  Likewise, Garvía (2007) demonstrated that lottery 
tickets are often shared based on interpersonal ties in Spain, and such rituals 
transform the conceptualization of lottery gambling from that involving pure 
economic assets to one that becomes a symbolic carrier of social relationship 
and status.  This may, in part, explain the unique popularity of lottery gambling 
in Spain, compared with that in other nations.   
 Given the culturally-variant normative acceptance of certain markets, 
whether and how do such norm variations affect organizations’ decisions to 
participate in these markets? There are multiple channels through which 
managers construct the proper scope of commercial activity, including 
individual mental accounting, social norms and laws (Krawiec, 2009).  While 
individual mental accounting is rooted in people's cultural upbringings, social 
norms and legal rules, at the institutional level, reinforce these valuations and 
boundaries of tradable goods.  Some commercial exchanges are distasteful to 
certain members of the society (Roth, 2007).  Other commercial exchanges are 
strictly forbidden as a means to restrict access to an item or activity considered 
dangerous or harmful to society. Illegal drugs, such as heroin and cocaine, and 
some types of weapons, fall into this category.  Whether trade is permissible at 




individual level.   The sale of cadavers, though partly legalized, persists in being 
categorized as immoral, according to individual and societal values (Anteby, 
2010). These channels through which managers construct the proper scope of 
commercial activity do not always operate uniformly across the board.  The legal 
standards on economic exchanges can be diverse across national states; for 
example, the legal status of prostitution varies from country to country, from that 
of a crime to one of a regulated profession.  
 
Organizational Participation in Morally Contested Markets 
 Applying the theory of morally contested markets on the carbon market 
of interest, I argue that cross-cultural differences on the acceptability of 
environmental markets will shape firms’ choices of carbon emission reduction 
strategy.  Companies and managers are culturally informed, and they devise 
strategic decisions in accordance with prevailing cultural beliefs.  This influence 
extends, it is important to note, to such effect that managers will tend to become 
acutely responsive to citizens’ values, which contrasts behaviors seen in other 
areas of firm strategy where the cultural effect is subdued by motivations in 
other dimensions (cf. Hamilton and Biggart, 1988).  The carbon market is 
relatively new, and activities that characterize markets are relatively unstable.  
Firms experience a lot of uncertainty dealing with the market, which makes them 
more susceptible to public sentiment (Pinkse, 2007).  After all, emission 




 Hypothesis 1:  Firms in countries where people tend to express higher 
enviro-prioritizing values, when faced with the environmental-economic 
interests tradeoff, will be less likely to engage in the carbon credit market. 
 
 Firms rely on suppliers, capital markets, labor markets and customers, as  
well as on states, for their stability (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978).  Exactly what 
institutional forces motivate firms to respond when they comply with 
headquarters-national culture norms?  In addition to examining direct effects, I 
look further, to examine how organizational strategic and structural factors 
influence corporate responses to cultural pressures, leading to variation in the 
encompassing impact of institutional environment.  By complying with the 
national culture, firms may intend to build image and maintain reputation toward 
their external stakeholders that constitute their existing and potential customers 
(Fisman, Heal and Neal, 2006). A large literature on ethical consumers has 
shown that customers may be scattered across a wider society that as a whole, 
prefers to buy the products of a socially responsible company and willing to pay 
more (Elfenbein and McManus, 2010), for simply altruistic reasons (Casadesus-
Masanell, Crooke, Reinhardt, and Vasishth, 2009), or for the bragging rights 
(Schuler and Christmann, 2011), and may boycott the products of a company 
when they are perceived to violate ethical codes (King and Pearce, 2010).  Thus, 





 Hypothesis 2:  The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be particularly strong for 
firms that hold greater concerns toward their consumers.  
 
 Beyond the consumer as external stakeholder, internal groups such as 
employees are also likely to exert a normative influence.  By complying with the 
values of the employees, organizations enhance their perceived legitimacy and 
social fitness.  For example, Lounsbury (2001) finds that the presence of student 
groups can account for variation in the recycling strategies that universities 
adopt.  Delmas and Toffel (2008) find that organizational functional structure 
affects facility managers’ receptivity to institutional pressures.  Beyond 
organizational practices in the environmental domain, Ingram and Simons 
(1995) find that one of the determinants of organizations' responsiveness to 
work-family issues is the existence of a female at the management level. Thus, I 
argue that firms may intend to attract the internal stakeholder, constituted by 
their existing and potential employees, and the effect of cultural values is 
particularly acute when the firms have higher reliance on employees:  
 Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be particularly strong for 





 Corporate elites may also act as decisive agents in devising strategies 
related to corporate social responsibility in general.  It is been widely accepted 
that organizations’ outcomes can be understood as the “reflections of the values 
and cognitive bases of powerful actors in the organization” (Hambrick and 
Mason, 1984: 193).  When it comes to CSR, empirical evidence suggests that the 
upper echelons play a significant role in impacting CSR policies of their 
companies by acting according to their personal values, beliefs and biographies 
(Drumwright, 1994; Hemingway and Maclagan, 2004; Choi and Wang, 2007).  
Related to firms' carbon market participation decisions, survey evidence show 
that when CEOs do not possess an economics or finance education background, 
they would be less likely to express sympathetic views toward the carbon 
market.  I postulate that the cultural norms also take effect through CEO's 
preferences for carbon trading.  Thus, 
 Hypothesis 4: The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be particularly strong for 
firms whose executive officer has no economics or finance educational 
background.  
 
 I also consider the alternative sources of norm providers, including the 
state as well as other organizations. Under conditions of institutional pluralism 
where fields generate multiple, sometimes-contradictory institutional logics 




pressures (Kraatz and Block, 2008).  Contradictory institutional logics may 
render organizations addressing multiple and competing demands face a 
dilemma and submit to a more powerful and centralized source of legitimacy.  In 
the context of the emission trading markets, regulatory pressure to cut emissions 
is one of the main drivers for business interest in the carbon market.  Being 
capped to reduce emission increases the potential costs of not meeting the 
emission abatement target.  Besides, the regulation provides ideological support 
for certain market exchanges (Ingram and Simons, 2000), and state endorsement 
is one of the most important factors that propel the market.  Here, while moral 
values might oppose the environmental market, the regulatory pressure endorses 
it.  Thus, firms that operate under a singular dimension of normative pressure 
would exhibits actions most consistent with the demand of the cultural norm. 
 Hypothesis 5:  The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be particularly strong for 
firms that have no regulatory compliance requirement to reduce emissions. 
  
 Lastly, institutional theory suggests that a practice may become 
acceptable when it is sufficiently widespread. Even for an institutionally 
contested practice, the diffusion of the practice may be facilitated by well-known 
institutional processes such as mimetic isomorphism. For instance, Davis and 
Greve (1997) found that when a company’s directors served on the boards of 




evaluate and even promote adoption. This is because board interlocks are 
regarded as a means to mitigate uncertainty about adoption decisions (Fligstein, 
1991).  As more of one’s board interlocks or similar other firms adopt, adoption 
may come to be seen as normatively appropriate.  I thus hypothesize that the 
values effect would be most evident when the cultural norms are to the least 
extent at odds with the norms exhibited by industry, country or connected peers.    
 Hypothesis 6:  The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be dampened for firms 
whose board interlocks participate in the carbon market. 
 Hypothesis 7:  The negative effect of higher enviro-prioritizing values on 
firms' participation in the carbon credit market will be dampened for firms 
whose industry or country peers participate in the carbon market. Figure 1 
summarizes the hypotheses.  





CHAPTER 5: METHODS 
Data 
 I collect data on European firms that face a relatively homogeneous 
regulatory environment and equal access to the carbon market, including the 
EU-ETS and the global carbon offset markets.  I gather data on publicly traded 
companies listed on major European stock indices during 2006-2009.  I 
determine whether a firm is listed on major European stock indices mainly by 
the coverage of the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), which sends surveys to 
companies in major indices annually on their greenhouse gas emissions and 
management strategies on behalf of institutional investors.2  I focus on firms that 
headquartered in Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, as comparable environmental 
values information is only available for these countries in the region.  From 2006 
to 2009, I identify 1,333 unique companies that aggregate to 3,593 firm-year 
observations.  Among them, 752 firms (1,855 firm-year observations) responded 
to CDP survey in at least one of the four years, disclosing their carbon strategies.  
Table 1 presents the distributions of headquarters countries for the companies in 
our sample, divided by whether the firm responded to the CDP survey at a given 
year.   
 
                                                2	  The sample is compiled from CDP publications including reports on FTSE 250 (2006), FTSE 
350 (2007-09); France 120(2006-08); France 250(2009); Germany 200(2006-09); Nordic 125(2006); 
Nordic 190(2007); Nordic 200(2008-09); Switzerland 50 (2006); Switzerland 100 (2007-2009); Italy 
40 (2006-07); Italy 60 (2010); Netherland 50 (2007-2009); Spain 35(2007); Spain 85(2008-09); and 





TABLE 1 – Sample Distribution 
by Firms' Headquarters Countries 
 
Notes: The table lists the sample distribution by firms' headquarters countries, as 
well as firm disclosure status (0/1). 
 
Variables 
 There are typically two clusters of options for firms aiming to reduce 
carbon footprint: (1) reduce in-house, which includes on-site installation of 
renewable energy, efficient lighting programs, building insulation, and energy-
saving process improvement; (2) trade on market, which includes purchasing 
Country Environmental Disclosure Total  
 0 1   
Finland 66 81 147 4.09% 
 44.90% 55.10% 100%  
France 301 225 526 14.64% 
 57.22% 42.78% 100%  
Germany 400 329 729 20.29% 
 54.87% 45.13% 100%  
Italy 72 53 125 3.48% 
 57.60% 42.40% 100%  
Netherlands 19 24 43 1.20% 
 44.19% 55.81% 100%  
Norway 92 58 150 4.17% 
 61.33% 38.67% 100%  
Spain 118 81 199 5.54% 
 59.30% 40.70% 100%  
Sweden 72 174 246 6.85% 
 29.27% 70.73% 100%  
Switzerland 149 160 309 8.60% 
 48.22% 51.78% 100%  
United Kingdom 449 670 1119 31.14% 
 40.13% 59.87% 100%  
Total 1738 1855 3593  




credits through market-based mechanisms including EU ETS and carbon offset 
markets including CDM, JI, or retiring Renewable Energy Certificates.  I code 
data on firms' carbon strategies under these categories mainly from the CDP 
survey response.  Since these data are self-reported in nature, I cross-checked 
and complemented the data on offsetting with the carbon offset market registries, 
including the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 
(JI) registries, both accessed from UNFCCC website. In-house reduction 
measures are cross-validated with the Bloomberg database on green initiatives 
under the Environmental, Social and Governance Indicators. I code the 
dependent variable Participation in morally contested market(D) as 1 if a firm 
trades on market and 0 otherwise.  The hypothesis suggests that if a country's 
enviro-priority value is high, firms will be less inclined to trade on market.  Of 
course, firms' choices of instruments can be further categorized into four types, 
and in the second set of analysis, I also code the dependent variable Participation 
in morally contested market(C), with four categories of participation decisions: 
do nothing; reduce in-house only; reduce in-house and in the meantime trade on 
market; trade on market only.  The hypothesis suggests that if a country's enviro-
priority value is high, firms will be more inclined to reduce in-house than to 
trade on market, and to engage both in-house and market emission reduction.   
 I match firms’ carbon strategies to the countries’ environmental values.  I 
focus on the values in each firm’s headquarters country, as most climate 




interpret environmental issues in line with public opinion in their headquarters 
countries (Levy and Kolk, 2002).  I measure a Country’s enviro-prioritizing 
value from the World Value Survey’s most recent wave during 2005-2009.  The 
World Value Survey is selected as it provides values data on a wider coverage of 
countries and covers a representative share of the population in each country.  
Besides, as the environmental questions were only part of a larger survey in the 
WVS, respondents are less likely to report upwardly than if they were answering 
in a specific environment survey (Torgler, Frey and Wilson, 2009).  
 Citizens from each of the ten countries are asked the following question 
in the WVS, “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing 
the environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own 
point of view? A. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it 
causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs B. Economic growth and 
creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some 
extent.” One of three values (1=A; 2=B; 3=Other Answers) is assigned to each 
response.  The item is reverse-coded so that strong preference for environment in 
the trade-off between environmental protection and economic growth is scored 
highest, and other answers are coded as no response. The average scores of 
citizens from each country are calculated and weighted by sample size. 
Additional analysis coded the other answers as 2, and response A, B at the value 




 I perform three analyses to establish the construct validity of the measure 
of the enviro-prioritizing value.  First, I correlate the enviro-prioritizing value 
with two other value items in the World Value Survey that carry implications on 
values tradeoff between environment and economics.  One item asks whether the 
respondent would give part of income for the environment, and the other asks 
whether the respondent would agree to an increase in taxes to prevent pollution. 
The correlation at individual levels between both items with the measure of the 
enviro-prioritizing value is 0.54 and 0.53 respectively, indicating that these items 
are reasonably correlated in measuring value tradeoffs.  Second, I construct 
another country level environment related variable,  a country’s general 
environmental concern.  This measure refers to extent to which pollution and 
resource consumption are pressing to the citizens in that county, and is coded 
from six related items in the European Value Survey 2008.  The country-level 
measure has a mild -0.22 correlation with the enviro-prioritizing value measure, 
indicating that a trade-off between the environment and the economics is a 
distinct value dimension from general environmental concerns. The detailed 
construction of all environmental values items is listed in Appendix A1.  Third, I 
also correlate the country-level measure with an actual environmental 
performance measure, the number of green party members per capita in a 
country, and find a 0.63 correlation.  Moreover, looking the environmental 
values in previous waves of the World Values survey shows that the rank is 




the measure to represent the relatively constant country-level cultural values on 
the acceptance of market-based solution to environmental problems.  Figure 1 
plots the value and market participation (as an indicator variable) by country.   
 
FIGURE 2 – Enviro-Prioritizing Values and 




Notes: The dark-colored bars show mean level of enviro-prioritizing values in each country.  Citizens 
from each of the ten countries are asked the following question in the WVS fourth wave, “Here are 
two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. 
Which of them comes closer to your own point of view? A. Protecting the environment should be 
given priority, even if it causes slower economic growth and some loss of jobs B. Economic growth 
and creating jobs should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent”, and they 
answer with three values (1=A; 2=B; 3=Other Answers). The item is reverse coded so that strong 
priority for environmental protection is scored highest, and other answers is coded as missing.  The 
light-colored bars show the mean values of country on whether a firm participates in the carbon 
market.  
 
 I match firm identifiers with the Worldscope and Datastream database to 




is measured by its selling, general & administrative expenses figure divided by 
sales (Fisman, Heal and Neal, 2006).  The higher the value is, the higher 
concentration a firm has on its customers. In a robustness check, I divide the 
industries by whether it is a consumer-oriented industry, interact the dummy 
variable with the values, and find consistent result to the reported specification.  
Sector unemployment rate, collected from Europa database, measures how 
reliant the firm is to its current employees.  The larger the number is, the less 
effort a firm spends in retaining its employees.  Firm has installation(s) under 
EUETS scheme is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has one or more 
installation regulated by the European Union to reduce their CO2 emissions.  
This variable is coded from the CDP survey. Firms that are not capped may still 
voluntarily use either or both market- or non-market based mechanisms for 
emission abatement.  For hypotheses 2-5, pre-test indicates problems of multi-
collinearity that is often associated with the interactive effects. I therefore mean 
centered these variables and interact them with mean-centered country's enviro-
prioritizing value, and report these results in all models.  
 I control for a host of firm level variables, including assets (in millions of 
U.S. dollars) and number of employees (in millions) as larger firms could 
possess more resources to experiment with new markets.  I also control for each 
firm’s Global Co2 Emissions, calculated as the sum of the scope 1 and scope 2 
emissions reported in the CDP data, as for low emission companies, the 




other country-level features that may lead firms to practice environmental 
management differently.  Because a country's economic development can affect 
environmental practices (Inglehart, 1990), I control for each country's annual 
GDP per capita, reported in thousands of 1996 U.S. dollars by The Economist 
Intelligence Unit.  The increase in CO2 emission intensity in the country will 
force the country to enforce international environmental agreements and hence 
will direct the firms in this respect.  I include as a control Country's Co2 
emission intensity, collected from the Compendium of Environmental 
Sustainability Indicator Collections housed at Columbia University.  National 
government involvement in environmental international governmental 
organizations reflects the government’s values and beliefs, and is likely to 
impact firm's activities in the environmental domains (Marquis and Toffel, 
2011).  I control for the number of environmental IGOs that the county is a 
member of, drawing on data from Torfson and Ingram (2010).  
 For all models, industry sector fixed effects in 1 digit SIC code are 
included, as climate change has disproportional effects on those that produce 
fossil fuels (e.g., utilities), that depend on those fossil fuels directly (e.g., 
chemicals) or indirectly (e.g., automobile and aircraft manufactures), and those 
that want to develop new market opportunities arising from risk coverage or 
emerging emission trading systems (e.g., financial). I also control for year-fixed 
effects that account for among other yearly trends, the volatility of carbon credit 




constructed by taking average of the cost of a given industry's mix of internal 
reduction measures as indicated in the country specific marginal abatement cost 
curve (European Commission, 1999).  I also include in some models measures 
for weighted carbon market price, which is the yearly average price of reducing 
emissions on the market. Price data based mainly on spot EUETS allowances 
and CER prices for delivery in that year and is compiled from various industry 
reports on the market (PointCarbon 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010).  Table 2 reports 
the summary statistics for the subsample of firms that disclosed their carbon 
strategies. 
 
   TABLE 2 – Summary Statistics  
 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 
(1) Trade on Market Only (0/1) 0.04 0.18 0 1 
(2) Trade on Market  0.18 0.38 0 1 
    + In-House Reduction (0/1)     
(3) In-House Reduction (0/1) 0.44 0.5 0 1 
(4) Do Nothing (0/1) 0.34 0.48 0 1 
(5) Country's Enviro-Prioritizing Values 0.58 0.07 0.46 0.77 
(6) Firm's Asset (in mils of EUR) 0.08 0.32 0.02 3.77 
(7) Firm's No. of Employee (in mil) 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.6 
(8) Firm Global Co2 Emissions 5.39 16.93 0 247.18 
(9) Country's Co2 Emission Intensity 92.51 2.71 89.6 97.2 
(10) Country's GDP Per Capita 4471 9890 3194 9276 
(11) Firm's Marginal Abatement Cost 17.22 13.86 1.3 55.8 
(12) Weighted Carbon Market Price 15.49 3.18 11.4 18.87 
(13) Country's Membership  4.49 0.84 3 7 
   in Environmental IGOs     
(14) Firm's Consumer Orientation 19.49 14.8 0.21 79.88 
(15) Sector unemployment rate 6.89 1.23 2.2 10.8 
(16) CEO Econ or Finance background 0.35 0.48 0 1 
(17) Installation(s) under EUETS Scheme 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Notes: The correlation table is presented for the subsample that disclosed 






 I first use both a probit specification, as well as a multinomial logit 
specification to predict each firm’s use of carbon market strategies, with the data 
organized in a repeated cross-sectional design.  The probit specification is 
relatively straightforward, while the multinomial logit model needs more 
introduction. The dependent variable Participation in morally contested market 
(D), permits four categories of participation decisions which makes it a natural 
fit for a multinomial choice empirical model.  To model firm's decisions, I 
conceive firms as having multiple dimensions j ∈ J to their strategic set, which 
includes do nothing; reduce in-house only; reduce in-house and in the meantime 
trade on market; trade on market only.  Each firm i living in country c in year t 
attach a salience 
€ 
Vjict
 to each strategic choice j. Thus the more a firm prefers choice 
j, the higher values they attach to that choice.  And they select the strategic 
choice with highest value:  
€ 
Choiceict = { j :Vjict≥Vkict} 
 The multinomial logit framework allows examining empirically the 
extent to which firm's carbon strategies are related to observable characteristics 
of firms and their countries, represented as, 
€ 





 contains firm-level variables, and 
€ 
Zct








The coefficients reflect the possibility that the impact of each parameter varies 
with the choice.  
 Importantly, the coefficients that multinomial logit models estimate is 
about the relative preferences between choices rather than the absolute value of 
the salience that is attached to each preference. The model identifies coefficients 
of the form 
€ 
rj − rk
, which are the effects on choice j relative to a reference choice k. I 
also calculate marginal effects for selected models which have more 
interpretation advantages.   
 I test Hypothesis 1 with a model that predicts participation in morally 
contested market (D) based on the country's enviro-prioritizing values. The base 
category is set as in-house only.  Thus, a positive coefficient signifies that 
increases in an independent variable increase the probability that the firm 
choices that option rather than the less tainted internal reduction option.  I test 
Hypothesis 2 -5 by including an interaction term between the country’s enviro-
prioritizing value and the organization’s consumer orientation, sector 
unemployment rate, and CEO educational background.  I also interact firm has 
installation(s) under EUETS scheme with the number of market participation in 
similar or board interlocked other companies respectively with values. Because 
the sample includes several observations per country, I report clustered standard 




CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
Main Effects 
 The theory predicts that culture values prioritizing the environment in the 
headquarters country should lead to lower participation in the contested market.  
M1 in Table 3 presents the results of regressing the enviro-prioritizing value 
against firm use of contested market, with industry fixed effect and year fixed 
effect as the only controls.  High environmental priority value reduces the 
likelihood of firms participating in carbon markets significantly.  In M2, I enter 
the cost metrics of both in-house emission reduction and carbon market into the 
regression.  As the carbon market price does not vary by year, year fixed effects 
are dropped from this specification. The marginal abatement cost has a positive 
association with the tendency to engage in the market.  The carbon market price 
has a negative association with credit purchasing, but both effects are not 
significant.  Importantly, the effect of value remains negative and significant.  A 
concern here is that higher levels of enviro-prioritizing value could simply be a 
proxy for country environmental concern as well as levels of economic 
development. The environmental priority value might be associated with lower 
market participation because it sustains smaller organizational size or lower firm 
pollution level or lower cost of in-house emission abatement.  M3 thus includes 
country-level variables on Country's Co2 emission intensity, GDP per capita, 
environmental IGOs, and firm-level variable on asset, employees and Co2 




do not take any measures in carbon emission reduction, neither for the carbon 
market, nor for in-house reduction. In Model 4, I analyze the subsample of firms 
that engaged in at least one of the methods of emissions reduction, and find an 
even stronger values effect for the subsample. 
 
 
TABLE 3 - Probit Model on Participation in Morally Contested Market  
and Enviro-Prioritizing Value 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c) -2.094*** -2.293*** -2.686*** -5.224*** 
 (0.547) (0.647) (0.483) (0.797) 
Carbon Price  -0.002   
  (0.016)   
Marginal Abatement Cost  0.005 0.011*** 0.010*** 
  (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) 
Firm's Asset   0.005*** 0.004** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm's No. of Employee   3.296*** 1.360* 
   (1.117) (0.811) 
Firm Global Co2 Emissions   0.013*** 0.014*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Country's Environmental IGO   0.147*** 0.143*** 
   (0.035) (0.048) 
Country's Co2 Emission Intensity   -0.039*** -0.034* 
   (0.010) (0.018) 
Country's GDP Per Capita   0.007* 0.022*** 
   (0.004) (0.005) 
Industry Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed Effects Y N Y Y 
Constant -1.265*** -0.759* 0.865 0.365 
 (0.476) (0.407) (0.825) (1.454) 
Observations 1855 1855 1855 1216 
Log likelihood -897.186 -922.246 -823.713 -674.066 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, coded 1 if firm purchased carbon  
credits and 0 otherwise. Coefficients of probit regressions. Clustered standard errors by firm in 




 As mentioned earlier, some firms could employ one of the four 




in-house and in the meantime trade on market; trade on market only.  
Multinomial logit analysis allows examining the data in more details, 
particularly the question of firms' propensity to use market versus in-house 
reduction. Table 4.1 and 4.2 presents the results of regressing the enviro-
prioritizing value against firm use of contested market, employing the 
categorized dependent variable.  Throughout all three specifications in M5-M7, 
high environmental priority value reduces the likelihood of firms participating in 
carbon markets, comparing to in-house abatement significantly.   
 I report the marginal effects in the last four columns of Table 4.2 for 
interpretation purchases. The estimated effect of enviro-prioritizing values on 
the likelihood to choose the combination of market and in-house reduction 
strategy is negative and significant (M7 Marginal Effects, point estimate -0.808, 
p<.01).  The estimated effect of enviro-prioritizing values on the likelihood to 
choose the market only strategy is negative and significant (M7 Marginal 
Effects, point estimate -0.289, p<.05). The estimated effect of enviro-prioritizing 
values on the likelihood to choose the standalone in-house abatement is positive 
and significant (M7 Marginal Effects, point estimate 2.170, p<.01). Overall, the 
result suggests in countries where environmental protection is more prioritized, 
firms are more likely to be engaged in less tainted method of abatement 
reduction, regardless of the cost considerations.   
 Figure 3 plots the predicted probabilities with confidence bands for 




estimated in model 7.  Two interesting observations emerge from the plot.  First, 
the higher the enviro-prioritizing values, the less likely firms will use market 
solutions (the lower left panel), or the combinatorial solution (the lower right 
panel) to replace in-house reduction.  Second, the slope for the declining pattern 
is steeper for the lower right panel, suggesting that the values increase drops the 
propensity of using both market and in-house more than the propensity of using 
market only.  This is indicative of how values operate.  In environments with 
high moral codes, while firms could justify their use of market using pure 
economic rationality, mixing up both economic and moral rationality will expose 
them to higher level of scrutiny.  This is because in countries where carbon 
markets are slated, firms could possibly still justify using market because, for 
example, onsite renewable energy is prohibitively high. However, if they 
exercise both methods, stakeholders will question if the economic stories for 
market is authentic, and if a firm is trying to cover up market participation with 















TABLE 4.1 - Multinomial Logit Model on Participation in Morally  
Contested Market and Enviro-prioritizing values 
 
 M5 M6 































Country's Enviro-Proritizing  -4.374*** -6.943** -3.019 -5.813*** -8.035** -10.060*** 
   Values (1.527) (3.375) (3.524) (1.620) (3.763) (1.504) 
Firm's Asset    0.687*** -1.686 -0.541 
   (0.261) (2.326) (0.772) 
Firm's No. of Employee    3.237** -2.345 -29.739*** 
    (1.372) (3.903) (6.513) 
Firm's Global Co2 Emissions    0.031*** 0.001 0.016* 
    (0.009) (0.019) (0.008) 
Country's Environmental     0.153 -0.358 0.027 
  IGO    (0.099) (0.452) (0.073) 
Country's Co2     -0.021 0.083 0.045 
  Emission Intensity    (0.033) (0.168) (0.028) 
Country's GDP Per Capita    0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -1.872** -1.586* 0.619* -2.898 -7.245 -5.139** 
 (0.951) (0.845) (0.376) (2.717) (12.095) (2.340) 
No of Observation   1855   1855 
No of Unique Firms   752   752 
Log likelihood   -2023.176  -1783.070 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, divided into four categories: 
participates in carbon market only, participates in both carbon market and in-house reduction, 
participates in in-house reduction only (base category), and doing nothing. Coefficients of 
multinomial logit regressions. Clustered standard errors by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * 




















TABLE 4.2 - Multinomial Logit Model on Participation in Morally  
Contested Market and Enviro-prioritizing values 
 
 
 M7 M7 (Marginal Effects) 
















Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c) -8.855*** -9.043** -8.537*** -0.818*** -0.289** 2.170*** -1.183*** 
   (1.084) (4.109) (2.247) (0.218) (0.145) (0.372) (0.439) 
Firm's Asset 0.632*** -1.608 -0.369 0.119*** -0.054 0.024 -0.088 
 (0.222) (2.344) (0.671) (0.041) (0.078) (0.095) (0.149) 
Firm's No. of Employee 2.892** -1.408 -26.907*** 1.711*** 0.190 3.554*** -5.455*** 
 (1.435) (3.973) (6.062) (0.357) (0.158) (0.667) (1.152) 
Firm's Global Co2 Emissions 0.029*** 0.004 0.019** 0.003*** 0.000 -0.005** 0.002** 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Country's Environmental IGO 0.313*** -0.248 0.037 0.045*** -0.011 -0.029 -0.005 
 (0.083) (0.582) (0.102) (0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.018) 
Country's Co2 Emission Intensity -0.089*** 0.060 0.061** -0.016*** 0.002 -0.002 0.016** 
 (0.025) (0.198) (0.031) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) 
Country's GDP Per Capita 0.000*** -0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.021*** 0.016*** -0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) 
Weighted Carbon Market Price -0.046 -0.005 -0.027 -0.005 -0.001 0.008* -0.003 
 (0.030) (0.060) (0.017) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect No No No No No No No 
Constant 3.724** -6.498 -7.030***     
 (1.774) (13.677) (2.451)     
No of Observation   1855     
No of Unique Firms   752     
Log likelihood   -1856.159     
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, divided into four categories: 
participates in carbon market only, participates in both carbon market and in-house reduction, 
participates in in-house reduction only (base category), and doing nothing. Coefficients of 
multinomial logit regressions. Clustered standard errors by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * 
p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. (c) The corresponding variable is centered.  The last four columns report 


















FIGURE 3 – Predicted Probabilities of Different Outcomes  








 Summing up, I find a strong and significant effect of the headquarters 
countries’ environmental value on market participation, controlling for both 
country- and firm- level factors. To examine the mechanisms through which this 




I including the measures for consumer orientation, sector unemployment rates, 
CEO educational background, as well as the interaction term between these 
variables with the cultural value into the following specifications.  Table 5 
presents these results where M3 is the baseline model using the probit model. 
Alternative specification using multinomial regression produces comparable 
results, and is presented in Appendix Table 2.1 and 2.2.  The finding indicates 
that interaction effect for consumer orientation is present as hypothesized (M8, 
p<0.01).  Interestingly, the interaction of sector unemployment rates on market 
participation is negative but not significant.  It means that pressures firms face in 
retaining employees do not necessarily enhance the cultural effect, at least not in 
this context.   
 The specification, M9, explores the interaction between cultural values 
and regulation.  Firms with facilities that are stipulated to meet emission 
reduction goals are substantially more likely to engage in trading activities (M8, 
p<0.01), and the interaction effect between regulatory compliance with cultural 
values is positive and significant for the comparison between market only and 
in-house abatement only (M8, p<0.01).  This result seems to suggest that the 
provision of regulation give incentive as well as ideological support for carbon 
market participation, to the extent that it crowds out the influence of cultural 
norms.   
 Next, I start to explore how cultural norms interact with social influences 




other firms in the same country, other firms in the same industry and country, 
and calculate the number of market users in these two groups.  I also construct 
board interlock data using BoardEx, and look at the number of interlocked firms 
that also participate market in the past year.  The results for probit models are 
presented in Table 6.  It turns out that neither the main effects nor interaction 
effects turned out to be significant in these models.   
 
TABLE 5 - Probit Model on Participation on Interaction Effects 
 M8 M9 M10 
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c) -3.189*** -3.392*** -2.683*** 
 (0.537) (0.651) (0.715) 
Firm Asset 0.030 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.020) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm No. of Employee 2.640 1.917 3.327*** 
 (1.671) (1.229) (1.159) 
Firm Global Co2 Emissions 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 
 (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
IGO 0.213*** 0.154*** 0.141*** 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.035) 
CO2GDPEPI -0.034** -0.040*** -0.043*** 
 (0.014) (0.010) (0.012) 
GDP Per Capita 0.006 0.013*** 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm Consumer Orientation(c) 0.007**   
 (0.003)   
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)  -0.076**   
  X Firm Consumer Orientation(c) (0.037)   
Sector unemployment rate (c)  -0.004  
  (0.008)  
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)   -0.103  
  X Sector unemployment rate (c)  (0.105)  
CEO with an Economics Degree   0.553 
   (0.736) 
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)    6.469** 
  X CEO with an Economics Degree   (6.610) 
Constant 0.476 0.639 1.374 
 (1.133) (0.765) (0.905) 
Observations 1256 1855 1855 
Log likelihood -555.765 -456.624 -816.010 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, coded 1 if firm purchased 




by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. (c) The 
corresponding variable is centered.  
 
TABLE 6 - Probit Model on Interaction Effects (Cont.) 
 M11 M12 M13 M14 
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c) -2.937*** -1.978 -2.224** -2.683*** 
 (0.493) (1.402) (0.900) (0.715) 
Firm Asset 0.005** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm No. of Employee 2.415* 3.235*** 3.253*** 3.327*** 
 (1.310) (1.138) (1.180) (1.159) 
Firm Global Co2 Emissions 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.008*** 0.008** 0.012*** 0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
IGO 0.094** 0.130*** 0.194*** 0.141*** 
 (0.039) (0.049) (0.042) (0.035) 
CO2GDPEPI -0.024 -0.047*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) 
GDP Per Capita 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.006 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Firm Regulatory Compliance(c) 1.002***    
 (0.148)    
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)  2.499**    
  X Firm Regulatory Compliance(c) (1.275)    
Industry Peers' Participation  -0.006   
  (0.006)   
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)   0.026   
   X Industry Peers' Participation  (0.077)   
Country Peers' Participation(c)   0.012  
   (0.012)  
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)    0.092  
  X Country Peers' Participation (c)   (0.107)  
Interlocked Firms' Participation (c)    0.553 
    (0.736) 
Country Pro-Environmental Value(c)     0.469 
  X Interlocked Firms' Participation (c)    (0.610) 
Constant -0.164 2.693* 1.428 1.374 
 (1.254) (1.600) (1.167) (0.905) 
Observations 1855 1621 1598 1855 
Log likelihood -762.396 -755.954 -745.989 -816.010 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, coded 1 if firm purchased 
carbon credits and 0 otherwise. Coefficients of probit regressions. Clustered standard errors  
by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. (c) The 






One concern with the current models, is that if only some firms, a non-random 
sample, report their reductions. As a robustness check, I run analysis on all 
3,593 firm-year observations that disclosed their carbon strategy.  The 
dependent variable is whether a firm participates in the market for a given 
year, and the model is a probit model.  Result of this set of analysis is reported 
in Table 7.  A comparison of the probit estimates for market participation and 
the estimates presented here in this table, suggest broad similarities. In both 
cases, the headquarters country’s enviro-prioritizing values negatively predict 
market participation, and the effect remains to be enhanced for when firms 
have a high orientation on consumers, and its CEO possesses an education 
background in economics or finance, and subdued when it is for non-regulated 
firms is in a highly enviro-prioritizing country.  
 
TABLE 7 - Robustness Check: Selection Models 
 M15 M16 M17 M18 
Country's Enviro-prioritizing values -2.816*** -2.372*** -2.030*** -2.775*** 
 (0.736) (0.861) (0.731) (0.796) 
Firm's Consumer Orientation (c)  -0.007**   
  (0.003)   
Firm's Consumer Orientation (c)  -0.072*   
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c)  (0.043)   
Firm Has Installation(s) Under EUETS Scheme   0.925***  
   (0.129)  
Firm Has Installation(s) Under EUETS Scheme   2.315**  
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c)   (1.124)  
CEO with an Economics Degree (c)    0.734** 
    (0.372) 
CEO with an Economics Degree (c)    23.520*** 
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c)    (7.581) 
Country's Environmental IGOs 0.152*** 0.216*** 0.100* 0.215*** 
 (0.053) (0.069) (0.054) (0.060) 




 (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) 
Country's GDP Per Capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Firm's Asset 0.447*** 2.926** 0.433*** 0.432*** 
 (0.122) (1.257) (0.121) (0.134) 
Firm's No. of Employee 3.153*** 2.499*** 2.192*** 2.776*** 
 (0.596) (0.711) (0.560) (0.592) 
Firm's Global Co2 Emissions 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.010*** 0.009** 0.007** 0.012*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 1.230 0.920 0.391 1.325 
 (1.567) (1.929) (1.560) (1.691) 
Industry Fixed Effect (SIC 1 digit) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selection Model (If Disclosure==1)     
Firm Headquarter is Co-located with  0.351*** 0.467*** 0.355*** 0.413*** 
  the Survey Organization (0.057) (0.064) (0.056) (0.060) 
Constant -0.679*** -0.985*** -0.679*** -0.797*** 
 (0.086) (0.096) (0.086) (0.090) 
athrho Constant -0.371 -0.394 -0.548 -0.453 
 (0.449) (0.377) (0.362) (0.409) 
Observations 3593 2994 3593 3202 
Log likelihood -3207.141 -2467.904 -3145.244 -2764.016 
Chi-squared 132.957 114.294 144.768 127.310 
Notes: Dependent variable: 1 if a firm participates in the carbon market and 0 otherwise. 
Coefficients of probit regressions. Clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; 
Significance level: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The dependent variable in the selection model 
is carbon disclosure which is coded 1 if a firm responded to the CDP survey at a given year, and 
0 otherwise. Industry and year fixed effects are included in the selection model and omitted from 
reporting.   Standard errors are clustered by country and in parentheses; Significance level: * 
p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
 The other potential problem is of unobserved omitted variable on the 
country- and firm- level that are correlated with the cultural values and firms' 
choices.  To the extent that country value data is not available for later years, I 
cannot use country-fixed effects to deal with the issue so I include other 
country-level variables to partly alienate the concern.  To deal with omitted 
variable concerns on the firm level, I run additional robustness check using 




provides more detailed information on the ways in which firms that are under 
the EUETS meet their emission reduction targets at the facility level.  I collect 
information on the facilities in the ten countries during 2006-2010, and arrived 
at 25,754 facility-year observations in total.  I construct the dependent variable 
as the proportion of carbon emission units that a facility surrenders at a given 
year that was purchased from carbon market, and run an OLS model to look at 
how that proportion is associated with the country values where the facility is 
located.  As presented in Table 8, the result suggests that facilities located in 
enviro-prioritizing countries use less of credits purchased in the market (M1), 
and the effect is robust to the inclusion of year and industry fixed effects (M2).  
In M3 I capitalize on the fact that some firms own facilities in different 
countries and control for firm fixed effects, and the culture effect remains, 
providing some reassurance that the omitted variable concern on the firm level 
is less of a challenge.  
 
TABLE 8 - Robustness Check:  
OLS Model of Proportion of Purchased Carbon Credits among Total Verified 
Reduction 
 
 M1 M2 M3 
Facility Located Country's  -48.144* -32.144* -95.704** 
    Envir-prioritizing Values (25.695) (17.910) (43.926) 
Facility Co2 Emissions 2.087*** 2.470*** -1.687*** 
 (0.632) (0.599) (0.275) 
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes No 
Year Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
Sigma Constant -31.137* 1.433 31.054 
 (16.961) (8.446) (57.253) 
Constant 70.165*** 68.069*** 50.558 
 (10.175) (9.588) (7.370) 




Log likelihood -3.63e+04 -3.58e+04 -6522.29 
Notes: Dependent variable: the proportion of carbon credits an installation surrendered 
that is purchased from the carbon-offset market. Data complied from carbonmarketdata.com, 
and is on installation level for all firms that own one or more facilities under the EUETS 
scheme. Coefficients of OLS regressions. Clustered standard errors by country in parentheses; 
Significance level: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. The sample size dropped to 4544 in M3, as 





CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
 
Contribution to Theory 
 The intersection of economics and values has been a topic of central 
focus in the literature on the sociology of markets.  Challenging a neoclassical 
economic schema which idealizes a perfect market, and yet leaves legitimacy 
unconsidered, organizational analysts interested in markets have proposed to 
conceptualize markets as social constructions (Biggart and Delbridge, 2004; 
Fourcade and Healy, 2007). They have probed the mechanisms by which 
markets become culturally constituted (Callon, 1998; MacKenzie, 2006) and 
further, they have offered explanations of how contested commodities, such as 
faith, blood, sex, votes, or even life itself, are institutionalized into market 
exchange (Radin, 1996).  Their lenses of study, however, have placed emphasis 
on the change of meanings during commoditization, rather than on the strategies 
of organizations—especially those of organizations representing in buyer's 
roles—that drive such cultural shifts to become not only possible, but also 
legitimated.    This dissertation seeks to bridge this shortfall in the literature: By 
examining the differing choices of firms across varying cultural and institutional 
environments, I investigate the ways that organizational structure and strategy 
intersect with prevailing social norms, tipping firms' framing of institutional 
demands toward the economic or normative ends. 
 The results support the basic proposition that cultural values matter for 




firms headquartered in enviro-prioritizing countries, where citizens value 
environmental protection more than they do economic growth, are less likely to 
opt into the carbon market, in spite of the economic efficiency the market offers.  
Adding to insights on the national institutional construct of enviro-prioritizing 
values lends a more comprehensive understanding of firm market decisions, as 
market exchange outcomes hinge not only on social relations (Granovetter, 
1985; Uzzi 1996, 1997) and on power distribution (Blau, 1964; Emerson, 1976) 
but also on the legitimacy benefit that exchange might render (Jensen, 2006).  
Especially in budding markets such as the carbon market, which are 
characterized by significant uncertainty, firms that prescribe to the 
encompassing norms and expectations are more likely to obtain societal 
resources. Thus, by incorporating the influence of institutions, our study 
provides a more nuanced and complete understanding of trading decisions. 
 By studying the behavior of firms across ten nations’ institutional 
environments, this paper identifies the extent to which firms are influenced by 
institutional pressures directly and through mediated processes, such as via 
customers, employees or the upper echelons of their headquarters countries.  
Unpacking these differences is important given that the institutional environment 
has been critiqued as nothing more than myth and ceremony (Meyer and Rowan, 
1997), and thus this dissertation contributes to the research stream on variation 





institutional pressure (Oliver, 1991; Marquis and Toffel, 2011).  In particular, 
this results show that values beliefs matter for firms’ strategic carbon market 
participation decisions, through both external channels such as public image and 
reputation concerns, as well as internal rationales, such as CEO educational 
background.   
 This study also makes contribution to the literature on 
institutionalization, by teasing apart, in two ways, the sometimes puzzling 
effects of instrumental rationality and normative rationality that are commonly 
intertwined.  First, we demonstrate a strong effect of normative rationality, 
having accounted for the instrumental gains that carbon markets renders by 
controlling the relative cost of emission reduction and the carbon price.  Second, 
through studying a market in its early formation and contested stage, we reveal 
that a necessary condition for a practice to become successfully institutionalized, 
is for its instrumental and normative rationality to occupy the same domain, 
implying the capacity for mutually reinforcing influence.  This is an understated 
condition behind the diffusion mode of institutionalization process.  For it is 
only when the late adopters internalize the normative pressure from first movers 
as instrumental rationality of their own, the mimesis process would take effect.  
Similarly, this condition also provides activists, depicted in the political process 
mode of institutionalization, with the opportunity space to acquire and use 
heterogeneous bits of cultural elements and to shape the rhetoric surrounding 




 In contexts like the carbon market, where the rationale of economic 
efficiency is separated from normative rationality by strict moral codes 
(Durkheim, 2008[1912]), instutitionalization is a hardwon case.  Even though 
the practice is not short of the early movers, who were largely characterized with 
a number of factors (larger in size, higher in emissions levels or bear higher 
costs of emissions reduction), their adoption does not enhance the normative 
status of the carbon market.  To the opposite, it marginally deterred market 
participation from peers.  In other words, with moral appropriateness challenged, 
the decision of early movers to participate in an institutional project, in our case 
the carbon market, would not render the market mechanism an appropriate 
response to firms' collective corporate social responsibility toward global 
warming.  Instead, other firms shunned, either because of inertia, a lack of 
incentives, or the fear of being vilified as the "paying to pollute" type.  They are 
likely to stay away from the "tainted" carbon market, especially in combination 
with in-house emission reduction, and avoid the market mechanism unless 
otherwise stipulated.  This is the process through which moral contestation can 
turn a promising institutional innovation into an Indian burial ground.    
 Lastly, the paper also speaks to the emerging literature on the contested 
terrain of corporate social responsibility.  There are two possible reasons for 
the strong constraining values effects I found.  One posits that the moral 
objections toward the carbon market are too strong for firms to evade; I 




out multiple refutes for normative objections to the carbon market, arguing 
persuasively that most objections are not credibly evidenced.  Besides, the 
successful record of the acid rain market, even being much smaller in scale, 
indicates that a shifting of cultural attitudes toward the pollution market, given 
time, is indeed achievable (Levin and Espeland, 2002).  The second reason, 
and a more plausible one, relates to the contested nature of CSR activities 
(Carroll, 1991).  A key aspect of corporate social responsibility is dialogue 
with and responsibilities to diverse stakeholders that project conflicting 
demands and raise difficulties for companies seeking to meet those demands. 
The carbon market, as part of the CSR activities with a contested nature, are 
less liked because firms prefer to take the "cleaner" approach rather than 
reputation damage by immersing themselves in "muddied" waters.   
   
Managerial and Policy Implications 
 The moment that values are important, active management of CSR 
programs and corporate communication becomes critically important.  Besides, 
this paper has aims to arrive at implications for policy making.  Anti-
commoditization moral arguments are familiar, and in a lot of cases, have force.  
However, the design of the carbon market involves underappreciated moral 
dimensions, and what I have demonstrated here is that these moral charges have 
led to some real consequences.  It has been suggested that the key answer to 




reduce supply of carbon credits. The Durban conference in 2013 regards the low 
price points of the carbon credits as an indicator of a lack of confidence in the 
market, and recommends to either cut back the supply of carbon allowances or 
to tighten emission caps, thereby enhancing the demand for allowances.  But this 
approach is somewhat simplistic. An alternative argument, which I develop in 
this paper, focuses on the effect of outspoken, morals-based challenges to the 
carbon market.  
 How would the policymakers go about lifting the moral disdain toward 
the market mechanisms? One possible way is to stipulate a required adoption of 
a joint strategy for emissions reduction, reducing in house in tandem with using 
the carbon market.  Besides, the mushrooming of local and regional emissions 
markets all over the world, as noted above, provides new opportunities for 
market mechanisms to be experimented in local regions that are less morally 
resistant to this idea.  This allows for tailored solutions that achieve instrumental 
rationality locally, as a stepping stone for a system-wide cultural shift.   
 Morally motivated resistance to the operation of markets has profound 
implications with regard to the efficiency in the system as a whole (Oberholzer-
Gee, 2003). History presents no shortage of cases for the economic benefits 
stimulated by the decoupling of economic exchange from moral constraints, 
including the uplifting of religious prohibitions on money-lending (Weber, 
1979), the detachment of trades from privileges, and the advancement of labor 




a hugely profitable life insurance industry (Zelizer, 1979). Attention to the 
legitimacy issues in the carbon market counsels in favor of a larger role in 
providing firms a means for unencumbered entry to this market instrument, with 
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APPENDIX A1 - 
Items From Environmental Surveys 
Measure 1:  
Country’s Enviro-prioritizing values 
Source:  
WVS fourth wave. 
Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the 
environment and economic growth. Which of them comes closer to your own 
point of view?  
A. Protecting the environment should be given priority, even if it causes slower 
economic growth and some loss of jobs B. Economic growth and creating jobs 
should be the top priority, even if the environment suffers to some extent. 
(1=A; 2=B; otherwise missing).  
Country Coverage:  
All Ten Countries 
Coding:  
The item is reverse coded so that strong priority for environmental protection is 
scored highest. Sample population weighted average of the measure is used.  
 
Measure 2:  




WVS fourth wave. 
I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each 
one read out, can you tell me whether you agree strongly, agree, disagree or 
strongly disagree?  
(a) Would give part of my income for the environment. 
(b) I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent 
environmental pollution. 
(1 = strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = strongly disagree; otherwise 
missing) 
Country Coverage:  
Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
Coding:  
The item is reverse coded so that strong priority for environmental protection is 
scored highest. Sample population weighted average of the measure is used.  
 
Measure 3:  
Country’s General Environmental Concern 
Source:  
Aggregate of six questions from EVS 2008.  
I am now going to read out some statements about the environment. For each 




(c) We are approaching the limit of the number of people the earth can support 
(d) When humans interfere with nature it often produces disastrous 
consequences 
(e) Human ingenuity will ensure that the earth remains fit to live in. 
(f) The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern 
industrial nations 
(g)Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 
(h)If things continue on their present course, we will soon experience a major 
ecological catastrophe 
(1 = agree strongly; 2 = agree; 3 = disagree; 4 = disagree strongly) 
 
Country Coverage:  
All Ten Countries 
Coding:  
c, d, h are reversed coded, and the six scores are then averaged and weighted by 




APPENDIX TABLE A2.1 - Multinomial 






















Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c) -7.835*** -10.575** -9.491*** -7.560* 
 (0.806) (4.186) (1.770) (4.283) 
Firm's Consumer Orientation (c)   -0.016* -0.009 
   (0.008) (0.006) 
Firm's Consumer Orientation (c)   -0.338*** -0.373*** 
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c)   (0.130) (0.144) 
Firm's Asset 0.689*** -1.793 2.207 -13.105*** 
 (0.260) (2.458) (3.490) (2.462) 
Firm's No. of Employee 3.348** -2.199 3.209 1.418 
 (1.400) (3.915) (2.731) (2.316) 
Firm's Global Co2 Emissions 0.031*** 0.001 0.024*** -0.004 
 (0.009) (0.019) (0.006) (0.026) 
Country's Environmental IGOs 0.306*** -0.130 0.463*** -0.573 
 (0.074) (0.399) (0.083) (0.470) 
Country's Co2 Emission Intensity -0.066** 0.005 -0.039 0.116 
 (0.028) (0.148) (0.038) (0.156) 
Country's GDP Per Capita 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.018*** 0.019 0.017* 0.016 
 (0.005) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.117 -1.969 -2.301 -6.711 
 (2.176) (10.783) (2.745) (10.600) 
Observations  1855  1256 
No of Unique Firms  752  516 
Log likelihood  -1777.600  -1147.003 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, divided into four 
categories: participates in carbon market only, participates in both carbon market and 
in-house reduction, participates in in-house reduction only (base category), and doing 
nothing (omitted from reporting). Coefficients of multinomial logit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * p<.10, ** 












APPENDIX TABLE A2.2 - Multinomial 























Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c) -6.045*** -8.289* -8.327*** -10.599*** 
 (1.176) (4.237) (1.011) (4.062) 
Sector Unemployment Rate (c) -0.008 -0.045*   
 (0.013) (0.027)   
Sector Unemployment Rate (c) -0.132 -0.095   
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c) (0.219) (0.260)   
Firm Has Installation(s) Under EUETS 
Scheme 
  1.548*** 1.006*** 
   (0.255) (0.256) 
Firm Has Installation(s) Under EUETS 
Scheme 
  4.540 10.277*** 
  X Country's Enviro-prioritizing values(c)   (2.767) (2.930) 
Firm's Asset 0.860*** -0.806 0.669** -1.753 
 (0.288) (1.386) (0.290) (2.333) 
Firm's No. of Employee 2.179 2.586 2.326 -2.748 
 (1.807) (2.955) (1.514) (4.235) 
Firm's Global Co2 Emissions 0.026*** 0.006 0.021*** -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.018) 
Country's Environmental IGOs 0.286*** -1.445*** 0.241*** -0.187 
 (0.094) (0.407) (0.081) (0.356) 
Country's Co2 Emission Intensity -0.073** 0.427** -0.043 0.021 
 (0.033) (0.206) (0.035) (0.141) 
Country's GDP Per Capita 0.000*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Marginal Abatement Cost 0.014*** 0.001 0.015*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.015) (0.005) (0.016) 
Industry Fixed Effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.790 -26.129* -1.480 -3.048 
 (2.347) (14.627) (2.690) (10.698) 
Observations  934  1855 
No of Unique Firms  344  752 
Log likelihood  -848.484  -1712.990 
 
Notes: Dependent variable: Firm choice of carbon strategies, divided into four 
categories: participates in carbon market only, participates in both carbon market and 
in-house reduction, participates in in-house reduction only (base category), and doing 
nothing (omitted from reporting). Coefficients of multinomial logit regressions. 
Clustered standard errors by firm in parentheses; Significance level: * p<.10, ** 
p<.05, *** p<.01. (c) The corresponding variable is centered.   
 
 
 
